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I INTRODUCTION
1In this paper we are going to use the term mechanism in a rather informal sense as a set of rules, strategies and procedures. For a more formal use of the
term we refer, for instance, to [7] and [9].
2In what follows we identify a bidder bj ∈ B also by the index j ∈ N = {1, . . . , n}.
Lorenzo Cioni
Abstract-In this paper we describe a type of auction mechanism where the auctioneer A wants to auction an item ζ among a certain number
of bidders bi∈ B (i = 1, . . . , n) that submit bids in the auction with the aim of not getting ζ.Owing to this feature we call this mechanism a negative
auction. The main motivation of this mechanism is that both the bidders and the auctioneer give a negative value to the auctioned
item (and so they see it as a bad rather than a good).The mechanism is presented in its basic simple version and with some possible extensions that
account for the payment of a fee for not attending the auction, the interactions among the bidders and the presence of other supporting actors.
In this paper we describe a type of auction mechanism1                                                                       ζ among a certain
number of bidders2 bi ∈ B (i = 1, . . . , n) that submit bids in the auction with the aim of not getting ζ .Owing to this feature
we call this mechanism a negative auction ([4]). The main motivation of this mechanism is twofold ([7] and [8]):
- both the bidders and the auctioneer give a negative value to the auc tioned item (and so they see it as a bad
rather than a good),
-the auctioneer has an imperfect knowledge of the bidders and so cannot contact any of them directly.
The mechanism3, at least in its basic version, is simple and will be described in detail in section 5 whereas the needed
details will be presented in the sections 3 and 4.
Algorithm 1.1 The basic mechanism is based on the following steps.
- A selects the bidders bi according to some private criteria that depend on the nature of ζ;
- the bi submit their bids in a sealed bid auction; 
- once the bids have been submitted they are revealed so that: 
- the bidder who made the lowest bid is the losing bidder and gets4ζ; 
- the other bidders are termed winning bidders and get the beneﬁt of having avoided the allocation of ζ; 
- the losing bidder5 b1 gets ζ and, as a compensation, a sum equal to his bid x1;- each winning bidder bi pays to the
losing bidder a properly deﬁned frac tion of x1.
This simple mechanism will be described in some detail in the following sections together with the possible
strategies of the bidders and some possible extensions. The extensions include a pre auction phase, where some of the
bidders pay a fee for not attending the auction, and a post auction phase that can assume three forms and that aims at the
reallocation of ζ depending on criteria that are different from those that drove the auction phase itself.
3The proposed mechanism is loosely inspired by the Contract Net Protocol ([6, 14]).
4Possible ties among two or more losing bidders are resolved through a properly designed random device.
5We assume that after the bids have been revealed we renumber the bidders so that the losing bidder is the bidder b1 whereas all the other bidder bi (with
i 6= 1) are the winning bidders.
II PRE AUCTION AND POST AUCTION PHASES
In the pre auction phase the bidders are allowed to pay to A a fee f (that A ﬁxed and made common knowledge among the
bidders) for not attending the auction. In this case, depending on the amount of the fee, we can have that: 
- m bidders prefer to pay the fee in order to not attend the auction; 
- k = n − m bidders prefer to attend the auction.
In this case, at the end of the auction phase, A has collected an extra compensation equal to ec = mf that is awarded
to the losing bidder.The value ec (see also section 8) may be either a public knowledge among the bidders that therefore
know m but not necessarily k (since the value n is not necessarily a common knowledge among the bidders) before the
auction phase or it may be a private knowledge of A to be revealed only after the execution of the auction phase.
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As to the last point we note how this feature may be guaranteed or at least enforced through the design of the structure of
the pre auction phase that can be designed so to make the communication among the bidders either too  difficult or too
costly. The easiest solution is to have the bidders, at least in this phase, to be unaware one of the others so to make any inter
bidders communication impossible. In the present paper we consider only the private knowledge case so that the value ec 
has no inﬂuence on the behavior of the k attending bidders that do not have such information when they submit their bids
(see section 8).We note indeed how even the m bidders who paid the fee can attend the possible post auction phase. This
requires that in that phase the full set of bidders is revealed and becomes a common knowledge. In the post auction phase
we introduce some mechanisms that try to correct a simplifying assumption that we have made in the basic mechanism.
The basic mechanism is, indeed, based on the assumption that the various bi are independent one from the others (in 
the sense that the allocation of ζ to one of the bidders has eff ect only on that bidder) and, similarly, do not inﬂuence
any other actor6.The mechanisms of the post auction phase aim, indeed, at accounting for the following facts:
6With the term actor we denote a ﬁgure that is distinct from both A and the Bs but that wants to attend the auction since he thinks to be damaged
from the allocation of ζ to one of the bidders. Such actors are termed supporters and form the set S.
(pa1) the bidders bi are interdependent and so they may inﬂuence each other so that, for any pair of bidders (bi, bj), we 
can deﬁne as di,j the damage caused to bi from the allocation of ζ to bj;
(pa2) the bidders bi may inﬂuence the actors of the set S (see footnote 6) so that, for any actor si ∈ S, we can deﬁne
as Di,j the damage caused to si from the allocation of ζ to bj.
We may assume in general that di,j 6 = dj,i so the cross damages between pairs of bidders are not symmetrically distributed.In the
(pa1) case we assume that the bidders are interdependent but S = ∅. In this case the bidders can try to negotiate an allocation to
another bidder that is more preferred by all the bidders depending on the values di,j (for i  6 = j) and not on the values mi = di,i 
that drive the auction phase.In the (pa2) case, we assume that the bidders are independent but S 6= ∅. In this case the members 
of S may try to obtain a reallocation depending on the values Di,j. Last but not least the two cases (pa1) and (pa2) can be
merged in a single case where we have both interdependent bidders and S 6= ∅.In all the post auction cases the starting point
is the allocation of ζ to one of the bidders on the basis of the outcome of the auction phase where each bidder is guided only by
his self damage mi = di,i.At the end of the auction phase we can have two cases: 
- the resulting allocation is satisfactory7; 
- the resulting allocation is unsatisfactory.
In the former case no reallocation is required whereas in the latter case either the bidders of the set B or the supporters of the
set S may try to renegotiate it, within the proposed mechanisms in order to identify a new bidder as the more preferred allocation. 
We underline how such reallocation may require the raising of a further compensation for the new bidder in order to have
him accept the allocation of ζ .
III THE DEFINING PARAMETERS
Both the auctioneer A and the bidders of the set B are characterized by some parameters that depend heavily on the
nature of the item ζ but also on their individual characteristics.
7The concept of satisfaction will be deﬁned for each post auction phase. For the moment we say that an allocation is satisfactory if there are no
incentives for its modiﬁcation either from the members of B or from the members of S or from both.
Deﬁnition 3.1 For what concerns A we have only one parameter: the value mA that A assigns to ζ as a measure of his 
utility since the only beneﬁt that
A receives from the auction is the allocation of ζ .  With mA we denote: 
- the damage or the negative utility that A will receive from ζ if the auction is void so the allocation fails; 
- the beneﬁt or the positive utility that A receives from the allocation of ζ to one of the bi ∈ B.
Observation 3.1 In the former case mA has a negative value whereas in the latter it has a positive value.
Deﬁnition 3.2 Every bi ∈ B is characterized by the following parameters (see also [7, 8]):
- a value mi that he assigns to ζ; 
- the amount xi he is willing to bid; 
- the random variables Xj that describe the bids of the other bidders; - the interval of the values [0, Mi] to which    
the mi belong; 
- the intervals of the values [0, Mj ] to which the Xj belong; 
- the differentiable cumulative distributions Fj of the values Xj ; 
- the corresponding density functions fj = F ′ j of such values.
Observation 3.2 We note that:
(1) the parameter mi has a dual meaning in the sense that: 
- it represents the damage that bi receives from the allocation of ζ;
- it represents the beneﬁt that bi gets from the allocation of ζ to some other bidder;
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(2) the parameter xi has a dual meaning in the sense that:
- it represents the sum that bi asks as a compensation for the allo cation of ζ;
- it deﬁnes the fraction ci of the compensation that bi has to pay to the losing bidder.
We can also deﬁne the following probabilities: 
- the probability pi for bi of losing the auction;
- the dual probability qi = 1 − pi for bi of winning the auction.
We recall that the losing bidder is the bidder who gets ζ and a compensation from the other bidders, the winning bidders.
IV THE BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
In this section we introduce the basic assumptions that we make on the parameters that characterize both the auctioneer and 
the bidders and that will be maintained through the rest of the paper.
Assumptions 4.1 The only assumption we can make on A is that his value mA is a private information of the auctioneer so 
that it is not known to the bidders.If we relax this assumption so that mA becomes a common knowledge among the 
bidders we may assume that such a knowledge may inﬂuence the evaluations of the bidders since they may derive form this
knowledge hints on the real nature of the auctioned item.
Assumptions 4.2 The basic assumptions that involve the characteristic parameters of the bidders may be summarized as
follows8: 
-the bidders are assumed to be risk neutral so that their utility is linearly separable ([7]) and can be expressed as the
difference between a beneﬁt and a damage and so as xi −mi if the bidder bi loses the auction or as mi − ci if he wins it;
-the random variables Xj are assumed to belong to a common interval [0, M] for a suitable M > 0;
-the random variables Xj are assumed to be independent random variables;
-the valuations mi are assumed to be private values of the single bidders; 
-the bidders bj are assumed to be symmetric so they are characterized by the same F and by the same corresponding f ;
- the random variables Xj are assumed to be uniformly distributed on the interval [0, M] so that we have, for x ∈ [0, 
M]: 
8See [7, 8]
x
P (Xj ≤ x) = F (x) =
M
(1)
f(x) =
1
M
(2)
and, correspondingly:
From the foregoing assumptions we derive that the probability pi for each bidder bi of losing the auction is the same for all 
the bidders so we can denote it as p and use q = 1−p to denote the dual probability of winning the auction.
Observation 4.1 Possible relaxations of the foregoing assumptions involve:
- the possibility that the bidders are risk adverse9 so that his utility is no more linearly separable but it is a convex
function of xi;
-the possibility that the evaluations are either common or interdependent among the bidders;
-the possibility that the bidders are asymmetric so that we can have different intervals [0, Mj] and different functions Fj 
and fj for each bidder bj as well as the possibility to have different distributions (such as a Gaussian or a triangular 
distribution) also under the symmetry assumption.
Such relaxations can be introduced either one at a time or in combinations. Their treatment, that makes the analysis more
complex, is out of the scope of the present paper and is the subject of further research efforts (see section 8 for further details).
9We recall that, in classical terms, a player is risk neutral ([5]) if he is indifferent between attending a lottery and receiving a sum equal to its expected
monetary value whereas he is risk averse if he prefers the expected value to attending the lottery. We can also say that a player is risk neutral if his utility
function is linearly separable in gain and loss whereas, if he is risk averse, it can be seen as a concave function. In our context we have to consider the
opposite perspective and so we consider the utility function of risk averse bidders as a convex function of its meaningful parameters.
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V THE BASIC MECHANISM AND ITS STRATEGIES
ci = x1
xi
The basic mechanism has only the auction phase among independent bidders with S = ∅.
Algorithm 5.1 We can describe the basic mechanism with the following algorithm10.
(ph1)  A auctions ζ ; 
(ph2) the bi make their bids xi in a sealed bid one shot auction;
(ph3)  the bids are revealed; 
(ph4)  the lowest bidding bidder11 b1 gets ζ and x1 as a compensation for this allocation;
(ph5)  each of the other bidders bi pays to b1      a fraction ci of x1 such that:
X
ci = x1
i6=1
(3)
Observation 5.1 For what concerns the values ci we assume a proportional repartition among the bidders so we have:
where                        In this way we account for the fact that the bidders who receive a bigger advantage from the alloc-
ation of ζ to b1 pay the higher fractions of the compensation. At this point we state and prove the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1 (Weakly dominant strategy) From the assumptions we made in section 4 we derive that it is a weakly
dominant strategy for each bidder to submit a bid xi equal to his evaluation mi of the auctioned item ζ.
Proof
From what we have stated in sections 3 and 4 we derive easily that the expected utility from the auction for every
bidder bi when he faces the phase (ph2) can be expressed as:
(4)
E(bi) = p(xi − mi) + (1 − p)(mi − x1
xi
X
as the sum of the utility if he loses the auction multiplied with the probability of losing it and the utility if he wins it
multiplied with the probability of winning it.Relation (5) can be rewritten as:
(5)
10Also in this section we assume that, when the phase (ph3) is over we can renumber the bidders so that b1 is the losing bidder whereas the bi (with i 6= 1)
are the winning bidders.
11Possible ties are resolved with the random selection of one of the tied bidders.
X =
∑
j6 =1
xj.
by using the following equalities:
that have been derived by using the hypotheses of independence and identical and uniform distribution of the Xj and by
imposing that the xi is lower than any of the Xj for            Since in relations (5) and (6) we want to impose that in any
case each bidder bi has a non negative utility we get the following constraints
12:
j 6 = i.
where y1 is the utility for bi if he loses and y2 is his utility if he wins. From the former constraint we derive:
For what concerns the latter constraint, from the deﬁnition of y2 and by performing the derivations with respect to
xi, we easily derive that:
12We note how we can write X = xi + X
′ where X′ accounts for the bids of the bidders distinct from b1 and bi.
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∑
It is easy to verify that we have y2(mi) > 0 whereas we cannot exclude that y2(M) may assume negative values 
though this is a rather unlikely event. From relations (7) and (8) we can easily see how:
-p has a maximum value of 1 for xi= 0, decreases for xi increasing and attains a null value for xi= M;
- q has dual behavior since it has a minimum value of 0 for xi= 0, increases for xi increasing and attains the maximum value of
1 for xi= M;
so that for xi < x¯i we have that p dominates q whereas we have the opposite for xi > x¯i. From relation (11) and relations
(7) and (8) we get:
(1−
xi
From relation (12), with some easy algebra, we derive:
We note that x¯i → 0 as n → ∞ so that q tends to dominate p for any xi. According to all this we have that bi should
maximize y2 so to bid no less than mi and so (given the constraint we have imposed on y1) he should bid a sum equal to mi.
Observation 5.4 We have in this way veriﬁed how the truthful bidding is a weakly dominant strategy for each bidder 
in the basic mechanism of the negative auction.
so y2 is concave decreasing with: 
-a maximum value equal to y2(0) = mi for xi = 0, 
-a minimum value equal to:
At this point we want to ﬁnd the value x¯i where we have
Observation 5.2 We note that we have:
where p′ is the derivative of p as a function of xi whereas: 
where q′ is the derivative of q as a function of xi.
Observation 5.3 It is obvious that at phase (ph3) each bi knows if he is the loser or one of the winners. In the former 
case he has a utility: 
whereas in the latter he has a utility:
Observation 5.5 The proposed mechanism has a strong analogy with a First Price Sealed Bid auction ([7]). In the auctions of 
this type the winning bidder is the highest offering bidder who pays his bid. Under hypotheses similar to the ones we made in 
sections 3 and 4 we have that in a First Price Sealed Bid auction the best strategy for each bidder is to bid a little less 
than one’s own evaluation or to bid xi =mi − δ with δ→ 0 for n→∞.
If we suppose to use negative prices our mechanism is analogous to a First Price Sealed Bid auction so, in our case, the 
best strategy for each bidder is to bid a little more than one’s own evaluation or to bid xi =mi + δ with δ→ 0 forn→∞.
VI    THE USE OF THE FEE
In this section we present the pre auction phase where: 
-m bidders pay the fee f in order to not attend the auction; 
- k = n −m bidders prefer to attend the auction.
We make the hypothesis that the sum ec = mf is a private information of A so it is unknown to the other k bidders 
that neither know n. For the k attending bidders we can repeat what we have said in section 5.In this case the losing 
bidder, at the end of the auction phase, gets the following ﬁnal compensation:
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If the mechanism has a post auction phase then all the initial n bidders can attend to it, as we will show in the 
following sections.At this point we deﬁne the following proﬁles:
(ne1) all the n bidders pay the fee f ,
(ne2) none of the n bidders pays the fee f .
We want to see if such proﬁles are Nash Equilibria13 (NE) or not.
In the case (ne1) we have that if the bidders collude among themselves and decide that they all pay the fee f they collect the sum 
ec = nf. In this case, every bidder would have a utility equal to
14 mi − f. If only one bidder bj individually violates the 
collusive agreement he gets a utility equal to:
since no further compensation from the auction phase is possible. The individual deviation is proﬁtable (so that (ne1)
is not a NE) if we have:
or if:
So if the fee f is such that the constraint (21) is satisﬁed for at least one bj the collusive agreement is not a NE and the 
auction cannot be void since A is able to ﬁnd a bidder to which to allocate ζ with a compensation paid by the other bidders.
We note that if A ﬁxes f as:
we have:
and so relation (21) is surely veriﬁed.
In the case (ne2) the individual deviation depends on the possible policies of the single bidders since we have that ec
= 0 so from this condition we cannot derive any incentive for the bidders to deviate. In order to understand under 
which conditions the case (ne2) can occur we therefore examine a more general case and so under which conditions a 
bidder is better off if he pays the fee than if he attends the auction.
A bidder bi has indeed the following possibilities
15:
(1) he pays the fee f and has an utility16 u
p
i =mi − f ;
(2) he does not pay and attend the auction and so:
(2a) he has an utility uli= xi−mi if he loses the auction,
(2b) he has an utility uwi = mi − x1
xi
xi+X′
if he wins the auction.
From the case (1) we derive the ﬁrst constraint since we have that if upi < 0 then bi does not pay the fee and attends 
the auction. This requires that:
or:
If condition (25) is violated for every bi so that we have:
13A Nash Equilibrium is a proﬁle of strategies for the bidders where none of them has a gain from an individual deviation ([1, 2, 9, 10]).
14This requires f < mi for every bi. We comment on this assumption shortly.
15We use the decorations p, l and w as exponents to denote, in the order, a payment, a loss and a win.
16In this case we evaluate the utility under the hypothesis of risk neutrality and so as the di erence between the beneﬁt, as represented by the missed 
allocation of , and the payment as represented by the fee f.
for every bi we have that no bidder pays the fee. In this way we have that if f > max{mi} or if f is very high no bidder 
pays the fee and so they all attend the auction phase. If f is assigned a lower value some of the bidders prefer to pay it 
whereas others prefer to attend the auction. Lastly, if f gets a very low value we have that all the bidders may prefer to 
pay it so that the auction phase is void, without any discordance with what we have seen with regard to (ne1).Once we 
have established that relation (24) is satisﬁed we want to make a comparison with the cases (2a) and (2b) so to 
understand if a bidder is better o  by paying the fee or by attending the auction. 
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and:
If such relations are satisﬁed then bi is better off by paying the fee and so by not attending the auction. From relation (27) we
derive:
(since we have assumed xi ≥ mi) and so not really a new constraint since it coincides with relation (25). On the other hand
from relation (28) we get:
since, by the deﬁnition of x1 and xi, we get X = xi + X′ ≥ (n − 1)x1 and x1 ≤ xi ≤ M for every bi. From relation (30) we
derive that if the fee f is small enough then the bidders have incentive to pay it otherwise they have incentives to attend the
auction. From this we may derive that if A ﬁxes f high enough (for instance f = M/2) he can be sure to have a non void
auction even if some bidders may prefer to pay the fee f.
VII    THE POST AUCTION PHASE
1)    Introductory remarks
In the simplest case, when the auction phase is over, the allocation is performed by the bidders on the basis of the values
mi = di,i only. This way of proceeding is based on the assumption that the bidders are independent and so that the alloca-
tion damages only each individual bidder and neither other bidders nor any other of the actors of the set S (the supporters).
n section 7.2 we see how we can account for the interdependence of the bidders and so for the damages among the bidders.
We therefore present an algorithm based on a succession of push operations by which a bidder can push  towards another
more preferred bidder (according to the valuesattributed to the cross damages di,j).In this case we have no supporters so that                            
In section 7.3 we assume that the bidders are independent but            and we examine if the supporters can push    
towards another more preferred bidder (according to the values attributed to the cross damages Di,j by the             Last but
not least in section 7.4 we present an attempt to merge the two approaches since we assume to have both interdependent bidders and
S = ∅.S = ∅.
si∈ S)
S = ∅.
2)    The interaction among the bidders
Deﬁnition 7.1 (The added parameters) In addition to the parameters we have seen in section 3 and the assumptions we
have made in section 4 we introduce the following parameters for every bidder bi:
-di,j ≥ 0 is the damage that bi receives if  is allocated to bj;
-ci,j ≥ 0 is the contribution that bi is willing to pay to bj to have him accept the allocation of .
Observation 7.1 It is obvious that mi = di,i and ci,i = 0.
Before going on we recall that the auction phase ends with the allocation of  to b1 who receives a compensation equal to
x1. We can deﬁne the due payment that b1 receives from every bidder               as:
ζ
ζ
bi 6= b1
(with X =
∑
j 6=1 xj ) so that we have:
We can also deﬁne:
to be used shortly.
Mechanism 7.1 In this case the mechanism has the following structure:
-possible pre auction phase, 
-auction phase, 
-allocation and compensation phase, -reallocation phase.
From the allocation and compensation phase b1 would get, from the members of                        the commitments of
payment     that form the compensatory sum   whereas the reallocation phase depends on the values di,j.When the
allocation phase is over, b1 orders the d1,j                           with regard to d1,1 = m1. We can have two cases:
so b1 is satisﬁed and no reallocation is required;
N−1 = N \ {1}
σi,1 Σ1
∀j 6= 1
- d1,1 < d1,j ∀j 6= 1
- ∃J1 ⊆ N−1 such that ∀j ∈ J1 d1,j < d1,1.
In the former case the mechanism ends and b1 receives the commitments at payment as effective compensations from the
other bidders. In the latter case b1 may negotiate a reallocation with the members of J1 that he orders in increasing order of
the damages di,j. We note that for any bj with j ∈ J1 we deﬁne as c¯1,j= d1,1− d1,j the maximum contribution that b1 is willing 
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We can make the following comparisons:
to have him accept ζ whereas with c1,j < c¯1,j we denote the current value of this contribution.
Algorithm 7.1 The attempt of reallocation may proceed along the following steps:
(1) b1 deﬁnes J1;
(2) we have two cases: 
      (2a) J1 = ∅ so go to (5);
(2b) J1 6= ∅ so go to (3);
(3) b1 contacts (in the order) a bj with j ∈ J1 and offers him a further compensation c1,j < c¯1,j so that bj would get
Σ = Σj + c1,j;
(4) at this point we have two cases: 
(4a) bj accepts and so becomes the new b1 with Σ1 = Σ j + c1,j; go to (1); 
(4b) bj refuses so we have two cases:
(4b1) there is one more bj that can be contacted so go to (3); 
(4b2)there is no bj to contact so the procedure ends with a failure; go to (5);
(5) end;
The operation at step (3) is a push operation through which the current b1 tries to allocate ζ to some other bidder bj having a
beneﬁt equal to d1,1− d1,j− c1,j. Such procedure may either succeed or fail. For it to succeed the current bjmust accept the
proposal of b1. It is easy to see that bjaccepts if the following conditions are veriﬁed:
(ac1) Σ ≥ mj
(ac2) dj,1 ≥ dj,j
If condition (ac1) is violated bjsurely refuses the push proposal whereas if the condition (ac2) is violated bjcan accept ζ
, with a risky decision, if he is sure he can push it to some other bidder bh such that dj,h < dj,1 < dj,j. The procedure has
the following termination conditions:
- when no bider accepts a push proposal from the current b1;
- when for a bidder b1 we have J1= ∅ so the currently losing bidder is satisﬁed with the allocation;
- when there would be a cycle.
The last case deserves some more comments. If we have, avoiding to rename the successive losing
bidders, the following succession of exchanges:
we have a cycle that could even give rise to a money pump for the initial b1.To prevent this from occurring we impose a
cut on the cycle so that the ﬁnal accepting bidder must be bk. This fact requires the recording of the various passages so to
detect any cycle and to apply the correcting action.
3)    The presence of the supporters
In this case we make the following assumptions: 
- the bidders are independent so we have di,j = 0 ∀i 6= j;
- we have s supporters si ∈ S so that for each si we have the damages Di,j that he receives from the allocation of ζ
to each bidder bj. Mechanism 7.2 Also in
this case (see section 7.2) the mechanism has the following structure:
- possible pre auction phase,
- auction phase,
- allocation and compensation phase,
- reallocation phase.
The reallocation is driven, in this case, by the members of S with their values Di,j. We can consider S as partitioned17:
where:
- A is the set of the si that agree with the allocation of ζ to b1 so that  si ∈ A if and only if Di,1 < Di,j for every bj 6= b1;
- D is the set of the si that disagree with the allocation of ζ to b1 so that si∈ D if and only if18 exists at least a bidder ji 6 = 1
such that Di,ji< Di,1.
17In a classic way we have S = A ∪D and A ∩D = ∅. 18We note that every si ∈ D may have his own ji.
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We can have the following cases:
(1) A = S and D = ∅ so no reallocation is required;
(2) A = ∅ and D = S so every si has at least a more preferred allocation;
(3) A = ∅ and D 6= ∅.
In the case (1) the procedure is obviously over.
In the case (2) for every si∈ D we can partition N as N = Li∪ {b1} ∪ Ui where:
- Li identiﬁes the bidders that cause to si a lower damage than b1 or the more preferred bidders;
- Ui identiﬁes the bidders that cause to si a greater damage than b1 or the less preferred bidders.
We can have two cases:
- ∩siLi= ∅,
= ∅- ∩siLi 6
In the former case no compromise is possible among the members of D so the allocation of ζ at the current b1 is
unchanged. In the latter case we can have two sub cases. In the former sub case we have ∩siLi = bj so the members of D
offer to bj both Σj(see section 7.2) and γj= xj−Σj to be shared proportionally among the members of D as:
We note that a proposal to bj is feasible only if, for each supporter si, the following feasibility condition holds:
If condition (37) is violated for at least one supporter then no proposal can be made so the Ssmust consider another of the available
bidders, if they have one, otherwise the procedure ends with a failure. If bjaccepts we have a new allocation otherwise the procedure
ends with a failure and the allocation is unchanged. For the conditions of acceptance for bj we refer to section 7.2. In this
case bj accepts if the offered total compensation is enough to cover the damage mj from the allocation of ζ since
the bidders are assumed to be independent. In the latter sub case we have L = ∩siLi ⊂ N so we identify a set of
l = |L| elements. In this case the members of D can use the Borda method19
19Given n alternatives the method is based on the fact that each voter assigns n − 1 points to the top ranked alternative, n − 2 to the second top ranked
alternative up to 0 point to the lowest ranked alternative. The points are added together and the alternatives ordered in a weakly descending order (ties are
indeed possible) so that the alternative that receives the highest number of points, in absence of ties, is the Borda winner. If we have ties on the top ranked
alternatives we can choose one of them at random as the Borda winner.
([12, 13]) on such elements so to deﬁne the Borda winner (be it bj) and apply to it what we have seen for the single outcome
sub case. In the case of a tie on the Borda winners one of such winners can be selected at random since they can be seen as
equivalent alternatives. If the new allocation is feasible and the Borda winner accepts the procedure is over otherwise the members of
D discard him and repeat the procedure on the reduced set L \ {bj} until one of the bidders accepts (so the procedure ends
with success) or there is no more Borda winners to be contacted so that the procedure ends with a failure.In the case (3) we have:
- ∀si ∈ A b1 is the best choice;
- ∀si∈ D there are preferred choices to b1.
If, for each si ∈D, we deﬁne the set Li = {j ∈N |Di,j<Di,1} we can deﬁne the set L= ∩si∈DLi so that we have three
cases:
(a) |L|= 0,
(b) |L| = 1,
(c) |L| > 1.
In the case (a) no reallocation is possible since there is no possible compromise among the members of D that
are not able to agree on a feasible alternative to b1. In the case (b) we have a bj (with j ∈ N) that is better than b1 for
the members of D. The members of D can proceed as follows:
- each si∈ D evaluates his individual gain Di,1− Di,j;
- they evaluate the collective gain Γi =
∑
s
i∈D
(Di,1− Di,j);
- they ask to the member of A how much they (as a whole) want to be paid to switch from b1 to bj, be it
ρ1,j. If the total of ρ1,j and the sum that the D have to pay to bj (that accounts also of the payments of
the other bidders but b1) to have him to accept ζ is lower than Γ i the reallocation is feasible and
the procedure may end with success otherwise it surely ends with a failure.We note that: 
- the reallocation actually succeeds if bj accepts so if the proposed total compensation cannot be lower than mj;
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-the sum ρ1,j is deﬁned by the members of the set A through a negotiation and is 
proportionally shared among the members of A so that each can compensate the major damages deriving from the new
allocation.
In the case (c) we have L ⊂ N such that bj is a better choice than b1 for any j ∈ L. In this case themembers of D can use the
Borda method to select the best choice from the set Land use it as in the case (b) . If they succeed the procedure is over
otherwise they discard that bidder from the set L, choose another bidder from the reduced L (if there is at least one bidder
available) and repeat the procedure. If all the attempts fail the procedure of reallocation ends with a failure.
4)    Interaction and support
In this section we sketch a possible algorithm that can be used in the case where: 
- the bidders are interdependent so that we have, in general, di,j ≥ 0 for any i 6= j ∈ N ;
- S 6= ∅ so that we have, in general, Di,j 6= 0 for any si ∈ S and j ∈ N .
Mechanism 7.3 Also in this case (see section 7.2) the mechanism has the following structure:
- possible pre auction phase, 
- auction phase, 
- allocation and compensation phase, 
- reallocation phase.
The reallocation depends on both the values di,j (where i and j identify the bidders) and the values Di,j (where i identify the
supporters and j identify the bidders). In the current version of the proposed algorithm we assume that the sets B and S can
act independently one from the other.
Algorithm 7.2 In this case we can adopt a procedure based on the following steps:
(1) the Bs deﬁne the set JB of suitable bidders as we have seen in section 7.2;
(2) the Ss deﬁne the set JS of suitable bidders as we have seen in section 7.3;
(3) they evaluate the set J = JB ∩ JS;
(4) if J = ∅ go to 9;
(5) if J 6= ∅ order J ;
(6) select the best bj from J , J = J \ {bj};
(7) bj is contacted and he is offered a compensation;
(8) bj can:
(8a) accept so he gets ζ and the compensation; go to 9;
(8b) refuse so that if J 6= ∅ go to 6 else go to 9;
(9)  end;
Observation 7.2 The steps (1) and (2) are simultaneous moves in the sense of Game Theory ([9, 10, 11]). The steps (4) and 
(8b) deﬁne the termination conditions with failure.At the step (8b) the contacted bidder has refused so that, if J 6= ∅, the mem
bers of B and S have another bidder to contact otherwise the procedure must end with a failure. On the other hand, at step (4), if
J = ∅ the procedure neither eff ectively starts since the two sets B and S have no common bidder to whom propose the
allocation.At the step (5) the bidders of the set J are ordered20 from the best to the worst by applying the Borda method to 
the following preference proﬁles: 
- the one produced by the members of B over the set J that derives from the ordering on the set JB;
- the one produced by the members of S over the set J that derives from the ordering on  the set JS.
The use of the Borda method avoids the carrying out of direct comparisons between the evaluations of the bidders through the
use of scores that account for the position of each bidder in the corresponding ordering. If the resulting proﬁle contains tied 
alternatives they can be contacted in any order since they are seen as equivalent from both the members of B and the members ofS.
20If |J | = 1 the proposed ordering operation proves obviously useless since there is only one bidder to be contacted.
Observation 7.3 At the step (7) it is necessary to collect a sum equal to Σ so that the members of B must collect a
sum cB and the members of S must collect a sum cS such that:
- the offer Σ to bj is enough to compensate him for the allocation of ζ and so together with what the bidders already
committed to pay to b1 is not lower than xj or Σ ≥ xj− Σj;
- the sum  is proportionally subdivided between the two sets B and S as, respectively:
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and:
- the sum cB is to be shared among the members of B proportionally according to ratios:
- the sum cS is to be shared among the members of S proportionally according to ratios:
VIII     CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE PLANS
In this paper we presented the structure of a negative auction mechanism under the form of a basic mechanism together with
some possible extensions. The extensions include both a pre auction phase and a post auction phase: the ﬁrst aims at reinforcing the
requirement of individual rationality21 whereas the latter aims at describing possible interactions among the bidders and the
supporters. The proposed extensions are still under development so that the full formal characterization is under way. One
of the reﬁnement we are planning to introduce, in the case of the interactions among the bidders without supporters (see section 7.2),
is the use of pull operations (in addition to the push operations) through which a set of bidders distinct from the current losing bidder
21A mechanism satisﬁes the property of individual rationality ([3], [7], [9]) if the involved players do not have a negative utility from attending to it and
so have some incentives from attending the mechanism.
can try to pull the allocation of ζ towards other more preferred bidders by sharing among themselves the cost of this
switching between bidders.A push operation can, indeed, be executed only by the currently losing bidder so that, if he is
satisﬁed with the allocation, no reallocation is possible though some other bidders may wish to pay him to have the item to
be pulled to another and more preferred bidder.Other future plans include the relaxations we have listed in section 4 so that
we plan to examine what happens if we assume that:
- the bidders are risk adverse so that they prefer either to pay the fee or to pay a ﬁxed amount for not getting ζ for sure            
than attending the auction with the risk of getting ζ though together with a compensatory sum;
- the evaluations are either common or interdependent among the bidders and in any waymay vary either after the pre auction
phase (if the associated values are common knowledge) or after the auction phase itself if a post auction phase is present;
- the bidders are asymmetric so we can have different intervals [0,Mi] and different functions Fi and fi for each bidder bi.
Last but not least we are planning to see what changes we may have in the auction phase if the sum ecis a common
knowledge among the bidders before they attend the auction phase.As a ﬁrst approximation we can expect that if the k
attending bidders know the value of m (and so the number of the bidders who paid the fee) they may be willing to bid less
than mi since each of them may consider to have a ﬁxed compensation equal to mf, in case of loss, and so he may wish to
increase the probability of losing the auction and such an increase may be obtained by simply bidding less than mi.
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